Introduction
The twentieth century witnessed a tidal wave of concern for the legal rights of children.1 The tide shows no sign of receding. An international movement, it led to the adoption of the Declaration of Geneva on the Rights of the Child in 1924 and, in 1989 , to the enactment of a United Na tions Convention on the Rights of the Child. By the spring of 2006, the 1989 Convention had been ratified by 192 states.2 Treaties and legislation have been more than matched by academic activity. Scholarship about the rights of children has become an active, and sometimes contentious, field of inquiry.3 The importance of family stability, the legitimacy of inter vention by the government, and the ultimate sources of children's status in the law have all been the subject of exploration, doubt, and debate.
In the midst of this remarkable scholarly activity, the history of the subject has not been much in evidence. For example, in the course of a useful overview of the subject, Hillary Rodham Clinton noted that "po litical theorists from Plato onward" had discussed the legal status of chil dren, reaching "conclusions inconsistent with the prevailing American ones."4 She left it at that. Either the political theorists did not interest her or she found their attitudes towards children unpalatable and wished to avoid publicizing their views. Some other authors have not gone even that far. They have taken it for granted that nothing of value was to be found in history, asserting that "historically, rights in society have been ascribed only to adults."5 Children have even been described as once having been "chattels" belonging to their parents.6
These statements are but examples. They reflect normal scholarly as sumptions of our day; and the assumptions have only been strengthened by the broader conclusions of some historians, preeminently Philippe Aries and Lawrence Stone, who have asserted that true affective rela tions within families did not exist before the modem era.7 It has become natural to assume that the past history of children's status in the law, par ticularly the distant past, has little relevance to current concerns.
Plausible reasons undeniably exist for closing the door on the subject's past. Dramatic changes have taken place over the centuries. But can it be true that there is nothing worthy of study? The law has long had to deal with the place of children in society. In particular the canon law's special concern for questions of what we call "family law" long required that some attention be paid to the place of children within society. It would be a surprise to find a blank, and in fact we do not.8 Perhaps, however, some thing of relevance to the subject even remains to be uncovered. In a Festschrift compiled to honor a distinguished student of the canon law, John Lynch, a short study of the history of law and practice, one which pays special attention to the rights of children and in particular to their right to be free from domestic violence, will not be out of place.
The Classical Canon Law
The medieval canon law had no separate title or book dealing with the rights and duties of children.9 Children's rights were treated, as if inci dentally, under the law's various subject matter headings. For example, one title of the Fourth book of the Gregorian Decretals (1234) which covered the church's matrimonial law, dealt with the special problems raised by the marriages of children.10 Similarly, in the Fifth book, which contained the penal law of the church, one short title was devoted to the delicts of children.11 No separate book in the Corpus iuris canonici or the Corpus iuris civilis brought together the disparate rights of children; and the treatise literature of the ius commune, enormous though it was, con tained a comparatively slim collection of writing expressly devoted to children's status in the law.12
The Child's Status in the Canon Law Despite its failure to create a separate body of law for children, the canon law did not neglect them. Under the medieval ius commune, chil dren enjoyed a status appropriate to their position in the world; and that status entailed special treatment under some circumstances. For exam ple, children were given the right to invoke restitutio in integrum in the ecclesiastical forum, following and expanding the remedy granted in the Roman law.13 The medieval canon law also asserted a special kind of ec clesiastical jurisdiction based upon the Church's responsibility towards persons who could not adequately protect themselves, miserabiles per sonae as they were called.14 This claim encompassed children in need of special protection. Particularly where there was no other legal recourse available, the tribunals of the Church claimed the right to intrude into 9 See Goldberg, "Legal Persona of the Child" (above note 8), 11-13. 10 X 4.2.1-14 {De desponsatione impuberum). 11 X 5.23.1-2 {De delictispuerorum). 12 See Martin Lipenius, Bibliothecta realis iuridica (Leipzig, 1757, repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1970) II, 47. The only treatise the author has been able to consult so far deal ing with the subject is itself quite thin; see., e.g., Johannes Christopherus Falckner (d. 1681), Discursus legalis dejuribus impuberum singularibus (Magdeburg, 1735), a quarto volume of fifty-two pages. otherwise secular matters in the service of the disadvantaged, needy chil dren among them.15
The claim was based upon a solicitude for the disadvantaged found in some of the Church's most ancient canons. Gratian's Decretum (c. 1140) contained several texts from earlier collections that stated the Church's claim and responsibility. Defense of the weak-of pilgrims, children, and widows-was the essence of doing justice.16 All causes involving oppression of the downtrodden should call forth the special solicitude of the Church.17 Conciliar decrees of the era when the classical canon law was born expressed the same desire to aid disadvantaged children. The canonists cited the Bible itself as the source of the church's special re sponsibility towards children. Thus a text the Book of Exodus: "Ye shall not afflict any widow or fatherless child" (Exod. 22:22), and a prayer from the Psalms asking God to "bring justice to the orphan and the down trodden" (Ps. 10:18), were invoked to justify the Church's intervention in the world in favor of the unfortunate.
The canonists also looked upon Roman law as a distinct factor in val idating this special canonical jurisdiction. The Emperor Constantine had granted a privilege to miserabiles personae in 334.18 According to its terms, all minors sui iuris had the right not to be drawn into litigation out side the province where they resided. This meant that although the court of the Emperor was regarded as the "general court of the whole world" under Roman law, pupilli nevertheless had the right not to be brought be fore it unless they had consented. The rule worked only to protect chil dren; it could not be invoked by their opponents; and if children chose to invoke jurisdiction of the imperial court, they could sue whomever they wished before it, just as any other Roman citizen could. The explanation given for this right, as stated by the medieval civilian Baldus de Ubaldis (d. 1400), was that the Emperor stood as a "special protector" for all miserabiles personae and was entitled to extend his special favor to children.19 15 See Jean Gilissen, Introduction historique au droit (Brussels: Bruylant, 1979) 548-551, which develops the theme that the church was "a ses debuts, le defenseur des faibles, notamment des enfants." The author takes the view that the father's role was that of safeguarding the child and that his right of correction was roughly equivalent to the modem right.
16 The medieval canonists of course did not argue that this provision still prevailed in practice. If anything, in terms of actual practice, they drew the closest analogy between it and the jurisdiction exercised by the papal court. However, they did also see an important principle in the rule of the Roman law: a recognition of the underlying justice of granting special rights to children in need. That such rights had existed in Roman law pro vided them with an additional reason for extending special jurisdictional privileges to children under the newer canon law.
On the other hand, there was little sentimentality about childhood con tained in the medieval canonical texts or commentaries. It is worth re calling that the medieval Church consigned unbaptized infants to Hell.20 The canonists spent little time on the lovability of the children who would benefit from this jurisdiction over miserabiles personae. In par ticular, the canon law never looked upon children as incapable of acting viciously. Nor did it assume they were the victims of circumstance when they did. "The life of minors and adolescents is uncertain," the canonists said, "because they are always prone to do wrong."21 Of anything ap proaching a modem child's "right to play" or a "right to education" we find nothing at all in the canonists.22 Because of their immaturity, chil dren who committed crimes might appropriately be punished more le niently than adults.23 But they were certainly to be punished. Protection of infants and widows there should be under the canon law, but the canonists insisted that it should not be the kind of reflexive or indiscrim inate protection that could easily turn into license.
This hesitation also shaped the nature of canonical jurisdiction over miserabiles personae asserted by the medieval church. The fact that a child was involved in a dispute was not of itself enough to give the ec clesiastical courts competence to hear an otherwise secular claim. What ever might be true for orphans in need, not all children would have qual ified as disadvantaged under the canon law. Indeed, most children would not. Jurisdiction over miserabiles personae contained within it the seeds for undermining established rules about the scope of temporal and spiri tual jurisdiction. It even had the potential to overturn assumptions about the right order of society. The canonists therefore hesitated to push it too far. They normally required that a child show something beyond minor ity status in order to invoke ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Absent unusual circumstances, few children within an existing family could have in voked this privilege; and even for others, something more-real poverty or palpable disadvantage-was required.
Legal Rights and Children
Something like the same ambiguity obtained in the field of substantive legal rights. The special status accorded to children by the medieval canon law brought with it recognition of a number of rights appropriate to their position in society, but the canonists stopped short of blanket pro tection for children. We know that human rights were at home in the me dieval ius commune, although an investigation of their exact nature has not produced scholarly agreement about their meaning.24 One of them was undeniably a right to life. Both Gratian's Decretum and the Decretales of Gregory IX appropriately contained texts devoted to the punish ment of infanticide.25 Synodal legislation also implemented the princi ple.26 Under the canon law, for a father to expose his child in the ancient Roman fashion was cause for freeing the child from the father's patria potestas, a significant incursion into the inherited temporal law's system of family law. Of course, this was not a subjective right, even in the sense that the child himself could assert it; it could only be exercised as part of its disciplinary jurisdiction by the courts of the Church.
Provision for the rights of children extended into the years of their in dependent existence. Parents were required to provide sustenance and support for their children, an obligation that was extended to the fathers of illegitimate children.27 Again, this was a broadening of the protection available under Roman law.28 The Church did however, affirm much of the Roman law in delineating the rights of children. It adopted the Roman law's system of cura and tutela for minors sui iuris, thus provid ing them with a guardian as a matter of right when there was need.29 The Church also took over and expanded the civilian's restitutio in integrum for children injured by transactions in their property during minority. The remedy might be sought even against the actions of one's own fa ther.30 It would not be correct to ascribe the canon law's position wholly to an altruistic desire to defend the rights of children. Guardianship and restitution serve more than one purpose under the law. It would be equally incorrect, however, to conclude that a desire to protect the inter ests of children was altogether absent from the law of the Church. Me dieval canonists mentioned their law's solicitude for the welfare of mi nors often enough to compel us to pay heed.
Any consideration of the rights of children must also pay heed to the most discussed aspect of life of medieval children: the right to free choice in marriage. The canonical rules for the validity of a marriage adopted by Pope Alexander III and incorporated into the developed canon law required only that the parties who wished to marry contract by words of present consent.31 This formulation ran counter to strongly en trenched views of the interests of families and, in some places, the rights of feudal lords; but the Church required no more than consent of the cou ple involved. It added that if that consent were coerced, the parties would have the opportunity later to "reclaim" against a contract and invalidate the marriage. What exactly moved the canonists to adopt this under standing of the nature of marriage remains a matter of debate; some scholars see the canon law as more "individualistic" than do others. can hardly be doubted, however, that it put into the hands of young peo ple a personal right to make a significant "life decision" free from outside control.
Finally, one ought to recognize the right of children to receive family property. The law of nature supplied the principle. Parents were under a natural obligation to sustain their children.33 In practice, this might in clude endowing daughters when they were married and passing on the patrimony at death. This was not an absolute right in the modern sense. Among other things it depended on the means at the disposal of the par ents and the needs of the children. A statute abridging the right could be defended under natural law principles, but only if the abridgment were not total and justified by cogent reason. Otherwise, under the ius com mune children had more than a hope of receiving a share of the family property; they had a right to it.
Violence and the Child
There are few more emotional subjects in this area of the law than the discipline of children. Do children have a right to freedom from physical chastisement? Some say yes.34 Spanking can turn into child abuse; too often it leads children to become abusers themselves. Some say no.35 Corporal discipline implemented by caring parents causes no harm, and the law's intervention in family matters should not intrude into the fam ily circle. It is natural to ask, therefore, whether the classical canon law had anything to say about the subject? Hostiensis, one of the most promi nent of the thirteenth century canonists, held (or at least expressed) the opinion that the canon law had little direct interest in the subject.36 Other writers, however, were willing to assert a slightly more aggressive posi tion for the Church's tribunals. Three features of the medieval canon law supported the stronger position: first, the curtailment of the scope of the rights attendant to patria potestas at least partly under Christian influ 33 ence and fully embraced by the canon law;37 second, texts in the Grego rian Decretals which expressly limited the powers of parents in disci plining their children to a reasonable level;38 and third, the parallel drawn by the canonists themselves with the canon law's prohibition against "laying violent hands" upon clerics.39 These features of the medieval canon law permitted, if they did not compel, the assertion of ecclesiasti cal jurisdiction to protect children at risk within a family. They lead us to expect that the canon law might well have produced the antecedents of modem laws that protect children against parental abuse.
However, some of the evidence points the other way. There was also much within the medieval canon law to discourage that expectation. The Ten Commandments include an injunction to honor one's father and mother, but not a word about child abuse. The admonition was not lost on the canon lawyers. Gratian's Decretum, for example, contained a text stating that "it is the natural order of mankind that children should obey their parents."40 Children in the home were to obey their parents; chil dren in holy orders gathered together were to be superintended by mature clergy.41 Children under the direction of teachers were subject to correc tion, including corporal punishment, at the hands of those teachers.42 Later handbooks on the law of the Church, which summed up and slightly extended received canonical learning, routinely contained sec tions devoted to the punishment of children who acted in disobedience to their parents. So far as the author can discover, they did not contain sec tions devoted to the reverse, the punishment of abusive parents.43 The same can be said of the books devoted to advice about domestic conduct; a standard section in them was "How children owe honor and obedience to their parents."44 It seems to be the reverse of the modern situation, where parental prerogatives have been subordinated to those of their children in many cases where there appears to be a conflict.45
When one looks into the voluminous writing from the later ius com mune for detailed discussion of the subject, something of the same ambi guity towards violence within the family is what one finds. The starting point was that every parent had a right to castigate his children causa correctionis.46 Children naturally needed correction, and their parents were to supply it. This rule contained a certain license for parents, but it also had two express limitations. First, parents must not act unreason ably; if they used immoderate or unnecessary force in the correction of their children, they acted unlawfully.47 Second, parents must act only for the sake of correcting the child; if they acted out of malice or in order to injure the child, they also acted contrary to the right order of society.48 Thus, it was commonly concluded, a father who disciplined his child out of inhumanity or with greater force than was necessary was subject to punishment at the hands of a judge.49
It may be contended, and with good reason, that this medieval formu lation begs the question. The canonical rule itself seems very much like 44 the law today,50 and in truth it does not say very much in substance. One would not now simply state it without examining how it was understood and implemented in practice. The question arises immediately: How much force is excessive, and how closely will a court inquire into the mo tives of the parent? These questions, rather than the generalities noted above, must provide any satisfactory understanding of the attitude of the ius commune. To approach them, one must look a little further for some details.
Even when this effort is pursued, it must be admitted that it produces hints and examples rather than complete discussions. There is little doubt that this was not a subject of predilection for the medieval lawyers. How ever, by and large, the medieval texts and commentaries do not suggest that the law had the same concern for or took the same attitude to child abuse that is normal today. Rather they suggest that intervention in favor of the child would be reserved for truly extreme cases. For example, it was lawful for a father to imprison his child for the purpose of chastise ment, even to do so with chains. And although the law required that this kind of imprisonment not be imposed maliciously or for no reason at all, the law also created a presumption that where a child was so imprisoned, the purpose had been legitimate correction.51 To "break the will" of a headstrong child seems to have a long history as a legitimate exercise of parental discipline.52
Details can be revealing too. It was apparently the rule under the ius commune that if a father used excessive force in chastising his child, he was to be punished only for the exact amount of the excess, not for the whole injury to the child.53 It is not obvious how such a rule of penal law could actually be put into practice, but it stands nonetheless as evidence of a habit of mind quite uncongenial to modern views about proper rela tions between parent and child. The jurists thus seem to have envisioned 53 See Jacobus Menochius, De praesumptionibus Commentaria (Venice, 1587) Lib. V, Praes. 14, no. 7: "... quod si pater excedit modum in castigando filium punitur solum de excessu, non autem de omnibus percussionibus," also citing other authors for the same proposition. some protection being granted to abused children, but they also appear to have restricted its potential scope.54 Overall, it appears, they devoted more attention to children's duties than to children's rights.
Ecclesiastical Court Practice
What happened in fact? The law of the Church was enforced by a sys tem of public courts in medieval and early modern England. Public crime called for public prosecution. At least where not confined by local cus tom or secular interference, the courts sought to put into practice the basic tenets of the canon law, including those sketched above. Records from these courts have survived in considerable quantities,55 so that it is possible to ask whether the canon law on children's rights was more than a theoretical system. And by now the records have now been explored in enough detail that they furnish a tentative answer to questions about the enforcement of children's rights.
Jurisdictional Privileges
The medieval canon law, it will be remembered, granted some special jurisdictional privileges to children. Under particular circumstances, they could assert a right to protection in the ecclesiastical forum. They also had the right to invoke the canonical restitutio in integrum to undo transactions that had harmed their interests during minority. The exami nation of the act books of the English spiritual courts, however, has not yet produced cases in which these provisions were put into force. Per haps something remains to be uncovered. It is difficult to prove a nega tive. But at least so far, no cases have been discovered of a child's claim ing the status of a miserabilis persona. And the institution of restitutio in integrum, although known and used in practice, was restricted to the al lowing admission of newly discovered evidence after the proper terms for production of proof had passed. Although it was available in theory, it appears that it was not accorded to English children in fact.
It seems likely that the absence from court records of such cases was the result of the nature of the jurisdiction ordinarily exercised by the En glish church, rather than indifference towards children. As a general mat ter, the canon law paid more attention to status than was paid in English practice. For instance, the medieval canon law held that (virtually) all cases brought against a cleric should be decided in the spiritual forum.56 Jurisdiction depended on the status of the litigants. However, in English practice, the Church's jurisdiction was based almost entirely on the sub ject matter of each case. Thus, testamentary causes were dealt with ac cording to whether real or personal property was at issue, not according to the status of the testator or the litigants.57 Until the sixteenth century, defamation belonged to the Church, whoever the parties were. Clerical status did not count in determining jurisdiction in most litigation. Only in criminal law were the clergy given special jurisdictional rights, the socalled benefit of clergy.58 English law did recognize status for some pur poses, but rarely for purposes of claiming the protection of a special court;59 and this attitude must have discouraged other claims than cleri cal status to invoke ecclesiastical jurisdiction, including those based on minority. In any event, the canonical provisions allowing children spe cial rights to invoke spiritual jurisdiction seem to have been dead letters in practice.
Substantive Rights
Despite the absence of special jurisdictional privileges from the court records, the needs of children were not wholly ignored in English prac tice. Children were given some protection in fact. Many of the theoreti cal rights detailed above had concrete results. They are found in the pages of the contemporary act books. Infanticide was punished, for ex ample, as in a Canterbury prosecution from 1470 in which a father was brought before the commissary court for having thrown his illegitimate child into a ditch filled with water, where the child died.60 Negligent as well as intentional acts that caused the death of infants-many of them probably cases of "overlaying"-also came before the ecclesiastical courts.61 Very few cases of infanticide occurred in the secular courts of The same can be said of the right to basic sustenance, which was routinely required of fathers of illegitimate children or fathers of children bom to a couple after a divorce or judicial separation had taken place. When, for example, John Walder and Paulina Galeweye ad mitted to fornication and subsequent birth of a child before the diocesan court at Rochester in 1347, the court ordered John to pay for the "for the sustenance of the aforesaid child" when it was disclosed that they could not marry because of the church's rules about prohibited degrees of con sanguinity.62 The sums were never great; and no real system of enforce ment was created to make the "child-support" obligation fully effective; but it is nonetheless appropriate to speak of a child's right to a level of basic sustenance.63 It was enforced in the ecclesiastical forum.
Concrete results of other basic rights available to children under the canon law also appeared in the medieval and early modem act books of the ecclesiastical courts. One was guardianship. Using a simplified form of the Roman law of cura and tutela, the courts appointed guardians to represent infants in litigation, to provide for their education and upbring ing, and to safeguard their property until they came of age.64 Loss or death of one's parent created a special need for legal protection of the children left behind. The courts met the need by use of this "trust-like" relationship. 65 The right of children to the portio legitima of their de ceased parent's estates also figured in English litigation, although it was increasingly confined to the northern province of York and the City of London over the course of the later Middle Ages.66 Finally, the courts consistently enforced the canon law's requirement of free consent in marriage, a clear advantage to young people in a world where the de mands of family and feudal lords might make it difficult for them to marry whom they chose. The extent to which the medieval church con sciously sought to counter these demands in the formulation of its defin ition of marriage has become a controversial subject in recent years;67 and the extent to which personal freedom in marriage came to extend in modern life would probably have astounded the medieval canonists.68 However, the seeds were there; and there can be little doubt that some young people did take advantage of the freedom to marry inherent in the canon law, choosing partners against the wishes of their families.69 Romeo and Juliet are instructive literary examples.
Violence in the Home
Coming now to the controversial subject of child-abuse, I should say that a determined effort on my part to find cases of parents or others being brought before the ecclesiastical courts for having used excessive force against their children has turned up virtually nothing. Unlike the temporal courts, where abuse of children sometimes came to light inci dentally in prosecutions for rape or homicide,70 surviving records of the spiritual courts have produced no such records. Cases involving hus bands who had committed acts of violence against their wives appear, but not acts against their children.71 Infanticide and exposure of infants were punished.72 Physical abuse apparently was not. It is of course im possible to prove a negative. But the archives searched and the act books examined have been many. The results have been almost nil. 73 In fact, what the records suggest is that the concern of the church ran in the op posite direction-towards protecting the interests of the parents against abuse by their children. It is just the reverse of the modem concern for the best interests of the child. The evidence thus seems to support Hillary Rodham Clinton's dismissal of evidence from the past as "inconsistent" with modern assumptions about the family.
Quite a few examples of prosecutions against children appear in the records. Some of them followed the "violent hands" pattern used as part of the Church's rule prohibiting and punishing physical attacks on cler ics.74 For example, Alice Kemp of Shoreham was summoned before the court of the archdeacon of Canterbury in 1500 to answer for having "laid violent hands upon her mother."75 In the consistory court of Rochester in 1458, John Hanschawe was also prosecuted for having "laid violent hands upon his mother;"76 and in the commissary court at Hereford in 1495, Thomas Cock was prosecuted for the identically phrased offense against his father.77 To take one example from the Northern Province of York, in 1418 before the court of the dean and chapter of York, John Wat son appeared charged with having "laid violent hands upon his father, in juring him even to the shedding of blood. "78 This pattern in language was not invariable, but the underlying offense was found in many places. Thomas Love at Winchester in 1527 was sum moned to answer simply for having "ill-treated his mother, thereby in juring her;"79 and a defendant in Canterbury in 1487 was prosecuted for allegedly having "injured his mother."80 A few entries added details of the action, as a 1503 prosecution of John Goldache of Chilham before the court of the archdeacon of Canterbury. He was cited for having, "on sev eral occasions thrown beer and milk into the face of his father, against the natural disposition of a son and contra bonos mores''8I A few of the cases involved action that stopped short of physical vio lence, as a 1598 prosecution against a daughter in Oxfordshire for hav ing "abused her father in hard speeches," apparently without having done anything more.82 Similarly a Yorkshire daughter who had "cursed" her father was subjected to discipline before the court of the Dean and Chapter of York in 1489.83 Like this one, some of the cases brought against children do not make clear whether the matter had been under taken as part of the Church's jurisdiction over defamation or that over fil ial misconduct.
No prosecutions so far discovered were founded upon acts of simple disobedience by a child. Although filial disobedience was a recognized legal fault under the ius commune-it constituted, for instance, just cause for disinheriting a child-the legal concept apparently did not be come a matter for prosecution in the Church's external forum. Some sort of affirmative and offensive act by the child was always necessary before the ecclesiastical courts would take action. These prosecutions never set tled into a regular form of entry in the medieval act books. "Routinization" happened in several areas of domestic relations practice, for exam ple, the prosecution of adultery or the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights. But nothing like a causa inobedientiae filiorum or a causa violencie contra parentes seems ever to have come into existence in the courts of the English church.
The result in cases where children were disciplined for abuse of their parents normally was a form of penance designed to reconcile parent and child, most commonly involving some kind of act of public submission to the parent by the child. The awarding of full public penance-the pub lic humiliation of standing in penitential garb before the assembled parish on Sunday-was not unknown in these cases. However, more often it was held in reserve. The more usual award of the English courts was to require the child publicly to seek the parent's pardon. For in stance, the already cited case of Elizabeth Gyles ended with an order to her to "ask her father's forgiveness" before parishioners from her neigh borhood.84 An order not to repeat the objectionable conduct in the future was sometimes added to this assignment of penance. Reconciliation of parents and children, together with public vindication of the principle of filial obedience, thus seem to have been the ecclesiastical law's goal. Be cause of this goal, these prosecutions against children were organized slightly differently; and defendants were treated somewhat more le niently than in the routine prosecutions for sexual offenses heard in the English ecclesiastical courts.
Conclusion
It would be a mistake to attempt to prove (or disprove) any thesis about the history of the status of medieval children on the basis of the ev idence presented here. Nor does the evidence possess more than a moni tory function for current disputes about children's rights. For one thing, the article addresses only a small portion of the subject. For another, the evidence here presented proves somewhat equivocal.
However, the evidence does clearly show that the subject has a history and that the canon law ought to be accorded a place within it. Children were accorded some special rights both in the medieval canon law and in 84 See above note 82. Gyles confessed the offense.
English court practice. They were not treated as chattels belonging to their parents. In punishing infanticide and providing orders to secure their adequate support, the courts even enforced the children's claims against the parents themselves. It may be, therefore, that a time has actu ally existed when children were entirely without legal rights; but the late Middle Ages in England was not one of them.
This being said, it is equally important to note that recognition of the rights of children was restricted when compared with any list a modem lawyer might compile. Conspicuous by their absence from the list of children's rights enforced by the medieval church are several we today take for granted: a right to education and a right to be free from forced child labor, not to speak of some of the more "advanced" rights being discussed today. If the medieval canon law took the rights of children se riously, therefore, the match between its conclusions and our own is not perfect. Most significant, in practice, the recognition of children's rights was not allowed to threaten the stability of existing families; some of the rights available under the formal canon law were ignored or given a re strictive reading, seemingly in service to the principles of parental au thority and social stability. Court actions to enforce a child's right to ad equate maintenance were apparently brought only against parents not living with their children. Guardians were appointed only for children not adequately represented by living parents. And by prosecuting abuse of parents by children, but not abuse of children by parents, as the evi dence so far uncovered suggests, the judges of the English ecclesiastical courts sought to give effect to the biblical injunction to honor one's fa ther and mother. They did so seemingly even at the expense of the rights of the children.
